Advice concerning the [ ] honorable lord director to the [ ], the 10th of November 1655.
In my opinion it is impossible to judge by the most recent incident between us and the natives whether the war between us and them is lawful or unlawful because it is first necessary to know whether they were the cause of it or not. The matter must be judged by their previous actions, for suppose that they had no evil designs in this matter, but having laid themselves open to suspicion and given cause for the incident, they will always be considered the instigators or aggressors and consequently the causa movens of the same. First, if the untimely gathering here of 1900 Indians without our knowledge and consent (of whom 800 were already here on this side) in order to attack 50 or 60, contrary to their usual manner, was not sufficient enough to cause suspicion of evil intentions, and if their insufferable insolence committed by breaking into Mr. Allerton’s house, and the beating of several burghers in their own houses did not increase the same suspicion thereafter, or their remaining here contrary to their promise, and the murder, which they tried to commit on the person of Capt. Paulus Leendertsz after the mounting of the guard, not powerful enough to conclude that it was an evil intention of theirs? And all the burghers (to whom the security of the fort was entrusted) assembled in it, and being there were they not obliged (because they were placed there to guard not only the fort but from there to defend the entire place) to give assistance to a burgher who cried, “murder” and “help,” and whether, being there and finding the same burgher wounded in the chest with an arrow, they were not obliged to run after the Indians in order to observe their composure and finding them armed and with guns whether they did not have cause to strike at them? But why do we try to argue so precisely about the lawfulness of a war between us and the Indians from the last incident, seeing that they have given a just and sufficient, indeed more than sufficient cause, before the conflict by murdering our people at various times, without having been willing to give us any restitution, contrary to the treaty made between them and us after the same incident, for the murdering of so many men, women and children, for the taking of so many prisoners, for the burning of so many farms and plantations, and for the destruction of so many animals, contrary to the article of the treaty that was especially requested by them, which stated that in case anyone of us or them should be killed in some mishap that war should not begin against one another before and until reparations and accommodations have been demanded, which having been refused, one should not be able to judge that the war against them is lawful, and in particular against those of Ahasiemes, Hachkinckeshacky, Tappan and others who were together in this incident and who did the most damage to our people and committed the abominable cruelties in the murdering of seven men and one woman, whom they murdered in cold blood (contrary to their promise, confirmed by an oath never before taken by them, namely, God above shall take revenge on us if we fail to keep our promise). However, of what advantage are these investigations to us, as we do not have the strength to pursue the war, whether it be lawful, or even necessary. Concerning the second article: as we do not have the strength to pursue the war, it is now untimely for the same; if we acquire the strength, then it shall be timely.
Since we do not have the strength to pursue the war (as I judge), the country in general should not be placed in danger by the same.
Concerning the fourth article: as we do not have the strength to pursue the war, then it necessarily follows that we must keep quiet until we acquire it; meanwhile we should not trust to much in the Indians. With regard to what we should do with the Indians concerning the losses suffered, I do not have any advice, since they cannot be recovered either by war or peace. With regard to the captives, experience teaches us that it must be accomplished through ransom.
Although I have never known the state of the treasury, still I can judge that the same is not well funded as alleged by the reasons about the imposts and otherwise, which is for us a great misfortune because this deficiency compels us to dismiss the soldiers during our great emergency, or to levy subsidies in an unsuitable time, for dismissing soldiers shall strengthen the enemy and make them bolder; on the contrary, weaken us and lower our spirits. On the other hand levying taxes shall be very difficult because the farmers have been ruined and shall be unable to pay the tenth, land tax, or homed cattle fee, so that the subsidies would have to be levied from the burghers of this place and of Fort Orange, but the burghers of this city, besides having suffered great loss in the ruin of farmers who were indebted to them, they have also furnished a considerable sum for payment of the blinds[1] constructed in the defensive works of this city, and especially for daily maintenance of the poor people, widows and orphans who were produced in this war, so that there is no hope for being able to acquire a sufficient sum for our urgent needs. Nevertheless, of two bad choices, one must avoid the worse one; it would be best (in my opinion) to levy subsidies rather than to dismiss the soldiers.
The means of [ levying ] these subsidies, and those who would feel it least, is by increasing the excise on beer and all sorts of wine; for the brewers, who now sell beer here at f24,- the tun, although the malt is no more expensive than when they sold it for f20-, would be able to bear an impost without harm; the same for the tappers who can still make a profit from their cheapest wine.
Concerning the Curaçao horses: if they are alive and can be found, it would be best to sell them, or otherwise to contract them out to the farmers, Dutch or English. Ady ut supra. (Was signed:) La Montagne.
